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11 Introduction
Friedman [11] suggested that a government should set the nominal interest rate equal to
zero to lead the economy to an eﬃcient outcome. He argued that only such a policy would
maximize the consumer surplus associated with money demand. That policy prescription
became known in the literature as the Friedman rule.
Phelps [15] pointed out that Friedman’s argument was a partial equilibrium one and
implicitly relied on the availability of lump-sum taxes. He then claimed that in a general
equilibrium context without lump-sum taxation, the Friedman rule was unlikely to be op-
timal. The reason for this would be the fact that a second-best policy would generally
encompass the use of all available distorting taxes, including inﬂation. However, Kimbrough
[12] later showed that Friedman’s prescription could be optimal in a shopping-time model
even if all sources of tax revenues were distorting.
After Kimbrough’s paper, several essays addressed the optimality of the Friedman rule.
A main lesson that emerges from Chari, Christiano and Kehoe [4] and [5]; Correia and Teles
[7] and [8]; and De Fiore and Teles [10] is that the optimality of the Friedman rule does
not critically rely on any speciﬁc type of monetary friction. For standard preferences and
technologies, that policy prescription is optimal in cash-in-advance, money-in-the-utility-
function and shopping-time economies.
The ﬁndings mentioned in the above paragraph make a strong case for the Friedman rule.
However, those ﬁndings depend on the implicit hypothesis that the planner has access to a
suﬃciently large set of distorting tax instruments.
Bhattacharya, Haslag and Russell [1] investigated the optimality of the Friedman rule in
overlapping generation models. According to them, that policy prescription usually fails to
be optimal in that class of models because the inﬂation tax is an instrument to implement
intergenerational transfers. They found that if the government has access to an alternative
instrument to carry out these type of transfers, then the Friedman rule is optimal.
Carlstrom and Fuerst [2] studied the problem of selecting the optimal monetary policy in
a small open economy. The monetary friction in their model was of the cash-in-advance type.
The Friedman rule failed to be optimal in that model. According to them, that failure was
due to the existence of an exogenous international interest rate that impacted the behavior
of domestic agents and constrained the choices of the Ramsey planner in such way that it
was optimal to deviate from the Friedman rule.
Cavalcanti and Villamil [3] analyzed the optimality of zero nominal interest rates in an
economy with an informal (untaxed) sector. They introduced money in their model by
means of a shopping-time constraint. They concluded that in such a context the Friedman
rule failed to be optimal. The reason for this was that the only possible way the government
could raise revenue from the informal sector was through inﬂation.
Nicolini [14] studied the optimal monetary policy in an economy with an informal (un-
taxed) sector. The monetary friction was of the cash-in-advance type. He found that the
Friedman rule was not optimal for the same reason that Cavalcanti and Villamil [3] did.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [17] investigated the optimality of the Friedman rule in a one-
2sector small open economy with cash and credit goods. As far as we know, they were the
ﬁrst to show that zero nominal interest rates could be optimal in an open-economy setup.
In their model, Friedman’s prescription would be optimal if the Ramsey planner were able
to use only consumption or both consumption and labor income taxes. If the consumption
tax were not available, the Friedman rule would not be optimal because inﬂation acted as a
partial substitute for that absent tax.
Sticky prices and imperfect competition may also aﬀect the optimality of the Friedman
rule. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [18] and [19] studied the properties of the optimal monetary
policy under those types of frictions. It turned out that the presence of either one would
prevent Friedman’s prescription from being optimal.
A way to clarify the contradictions concerning the optimality of the Friedman rule is to
take a deeper look at the set of distorting taxes available to the planner. As an example,
consider the cash-credit model in Chari, Christiano and Kehoe [4] and [5]. In that single
sector, single input and constant return-to-scale economy, there are only two possible dis-
torting taxes: on consumption τc and on labor income τl. If the planner can select τc or τl,
then the Friedman rule is optimal.
Consider now a situation in which there are three possible generic distorting taxes τ1, τ2
and τ3. There are seven cases to be looked into. Each of these cases is a non-empty subset
of {τ1,τ2,τ3}. One can interpret the non optimality of the Friedman rule in Carlstrom and
Fuerst [2], Cavalcanti and Villamil [3], Nicolini [14] and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [17] and
[19] as its non optimality for a particular subset of all conceivable distorting taxes that could
possibly be implemented in their economies.
Chari and Kehoe [6] deﬁned an economy’s tax system as complete i ft h en u m b e ro ft a x
rates the Ramsey planner can select is equal to the number of existing wedges and incomplete
if the number of tax instruments is smaller than the number of wedges. For the purposes of
this paper, we associate the expression second-best with policies chosen by a Ramsey planner
that has access to a complete tax system. Higher-order-best policies constitute an optimal
choice under incomplete tax systems. We say that a policy is Ramsey eﬃcient if it is a
second or higher-order best policy.
Studying the properties of optimal policies when a benevolent government cannot choose
some distorting taxes is a relevant exercise. For instance, any actual economy has some in-
formality and household production. It is not a trivial matter to tax these types of activities.
The federative nature of many nations may matter too. A central bank and a federal ﬁscal
authority may jointly design a macroeconomic policy and at the same time fail to induce
city and state administrations to set their tax rates at optimal levels. International treaties
constitute another constraining factor when it comes to the selection of tax rates.
The above discussion naturally leads us to inquire about the optimality of the Friedman
rule when the Ramsey planner is not able to choose all of several conceivable distorting taxes.
This is the problem we study in this paper. We investigate whether zero nominal interest
rates constitute a feature of second and higher-order best policies.
The task we have in mind does not allow us to restrict ourselves to a standard one-sector
monetary model. Therefore, in most of this paper we consider a two-sector (tradable and
3non-tradable) small open economy deterministic version of the cash-credit model of Lucas
and Stokey [13]. Consumers face a cash-in-advance constraint on a fraction of their purchases
of non-tradables. There is distorting taxation on labor income, on consumption of each type
of good and on foreign interest income. Government consumption is exogenous.
Of course, not only open economies have many sectors, goods and taxes. We chose to
consider an open economy for two reasons. First, actual economies are open economies.
Second, there already are some papers that study the optimality of the Friedman rule in
open economies, such as Carlstrom and Fuerst [2] and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [17], and
we want to relate our ﬁndings to theirs.
Our main conclusions are as follows. If the Ramsey planner can select the tax rate on
consumption, then the Friedman rule is optimal. The availability of other taxes is irrelevant
for this result. Additionally, we also show that there are circumstances in which consumption
taxes are not available and the Friedman rule is still optimal.
We wish to emphasize the relevance of the aforementioned ﬁndings. It is well known that
the Friedman rule is a feature of second-best policies in many monetary models. However, the
most common result found in the literature when the Ramsey planner does not have access
to a complete tax system is that zero nominal interest rates are not optimal. Our results
show that the non-optimality of the Friedman rule critically depends on the assumptions
concerning the availability of tax instruments.
Chari and Kehoe [6] emphasized that usually there is more than one tax system that
decentralizes a given allocation. We use this type of indeterminacy in this paper. Those
authors also pointed out that as the Ramsey planner loses tax instruments, more constraints
have to be added to the Ramsey problem. We also use this fact to characterize the Ramsey
eﬃcient policies. Our novelty consists in showing that a particular feature (i.e., the Friedman
rule) of the optimal macroeconomic policy survives the introduction of several constraints
in the Ramsey problem.
The ﬁnding that zero nominal interest rates may be a feature of higher-order-best policies
is not speciﬁc to the cash-credit two-sector small open economy considered in this paper. To
each result, we provide an intuitive explanation that can be carried over to other monetary
models. Nevertheless, in the Appendix we present a two-sector shopping-time economy and
show that the Friedman rule is a feature of a higher-order-best policy in that model too.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the cash-credit two-sector small
open economy we study in most of our analysis. Section 3 characterizes the set of competitive
equilibria and the Pareto eﬃcient allocation and policies of that economy. Section 4 discusses
its Ramsey eﬃcient policies. Section 5 presents our concluding remarks. The Appendix
brieﬂy discusses Ramsey eﬃcient policies in a two-sector shopping-time monetary economy.
2 The economy
Consider a small country populated by a single inﬁnitely lived household and a government.
The household is composed of a shopper and a worker, who are each endowed with one unit
of time.
4The country produces a non-tradable good. The household and the government consume
that good. The respective amounts they consume are denoted by cN and gN. The country
also produces a tradable good. The household and the government consume it; the respective
notations are cT and gT. The country can export or import this latter good; x denotes the
amount exported. A negative value for x means that the country is importing that good.
For future reference, deﬁne S = {T,N}.
Markets operate in a particular way. At a ﬁrst stage of each date t, a spot market for
goods and labor services operates. At a second stage, after the market for goods and labor
service closes, a securities and currency market operates.
A domestic currency M circulates in this economy. Agents trade two types of securities:
a claim B that pays (1 + i) units of M and a claim BF that pays (1 + iF) u n i t so fs o m e
foreign currency. Both claims mature after one period. Foreigners do not sell or buy claims
to the domestic currency.
The worker cannot sell her services outside the country. The shopper faces a cash-
in-advance constraint. A fraction cN
1 of the her purchases of cN must be paid for with
the domestic currency, while for the remainder cN
2 there is no such constraint. All other
transactions are liquidated during the securities and currency trading session. The date t
price, in terms of the foreign currency, of the tradable good is exogenous and equal to one.
Let ys and ls denote, respectively, the output of good s ∈ S and the amount of labor
allocated to its production. The inequality 0 ≤ ys ≤ (ls)αsdescribes the technology. The
share parameter satisﬁes αs ∈ (0,1].
A single competitive ﬁrm produces each good. Let lt denote the amount of labor the






























GN ⊂ R+, GT ⊂ R+ and IF ⊂ R++.
The government ﬁnances {gN
t ,g T
t }∞
t=0 by issuing and withdrawing the domestic currency;
by issuing and redeeming B; by purchasing and selling BF; and by taxing proﬁts, labor










































where Et is the nominal exchange rate; pN
t and wt are the respective date t monetary prices
(in terms of the domestic currency) of the non-tradable good and labor services; BF
Gt+1
stands for the foreign assets held by the government at the end of date t, while BF
Ht is
people’s foreign assets at the beginning of the same period; Mt+1 and Bt+1 are the amounts





t are the date t proﬁts; τl
t, τT
t and τN
t are tax rates on labor income and consumption;
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t are the tax rates on
proﬁts. A negative value for BF
Gt+1 means that the government is borrowing abroad, while
a negative value for Bt+1 means that the government is lending to the household. At t =0
the government holds an initial amount BF
G0 of foreign assets. The boundedness constraint  BF
G,t+1
  ≤ A<∞ prevents Ponzi schemes.
The function u : R3
+ × [0,1] → R ∪{ − ∞ } , u = u(cN
1 ,c N
2 ,c T,l), is the household period
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1t ≤ Mt .(5 )
Given initial cash and bond holdings (M0,B 0,BF




2t,l t,M t+1,B t+1,BF
Ht+1}∞
t=0 to maximize (3) subject to the constraints (4), (5) and
lt ≤ 1.








t . In a similar fashion, the other ﬁrm chooses lT




t )αT − wtlT
t .
3 Competitive equilibrium
We denote the date t price vector (pN
t ,E t,w t,i t+1) by ϕt and the sequence {ϕt}∞
t=0 by ϕ.








t ) is denoted by ξt and ξ = {ξt}∞
t=0 is
a tax policy.D a t e t allocations (lN
t ,lT
t ,x t,c N
1t,c N
2t,c T
t ,l t) and end-of-period asset holdings
(Mt+1,B t+1,BF
Ht+1,BF
Gt+1) are denoted, respectively, by χt and ζt+1. Additionally, χ =
{χt}∞
t=0 and ζ = {ζt+1}∞
t=0.
Deﬁnition 1 A competitive equilibrium for a tax policy ξ is an object (ϕ,χ,ζ) satisfy-
ing: (i) given ϕ and ξ, (χ,ζ) provides a solution for the household problem; (ii) wt =
pN
t αN(lN
t )αN−1 = EtαT(lT
t )αT−1; (iii) (1) and (2) hold. An array (ξ,ϕ,χ,ζ) is attainable if
(ϕ,χ,ζ) is a competitive equilibrium for ξ.

























6So, it is not necessary to specify this condition when deﬁning competitive equilibrium.
Next we characterize the set of competitive equilibrium allocations in terms of a few con-
straints. To simplify the notation, u(t), u1(t), u2(t), uT(t),a n dul(t) will denote, respectively,
the value of u and its partial derivatives ∂u/∂cN
1 , ∂u/∂cN











t + ul(t)lt ,
while W1(t), W2(t), WT(t),a n dWl(t) denote the partial derivatives of W(t).
There are seven conditions with obvious economic meaning that must hold in any com-


























where the empty product
0
r=1 is deﬁned to be equal to one. The third constraint is that
the household’s marginal rate of substitution between tradables and non-tradables must be
























t )1−αN ,(1 0 )




























































G0) .(1 2 )
The last one, which ensures that the nominal interest rate is greater or equal to zero, is
u2(t) ≤ u1(t) .(1 3 )








1,0 ≤ M0 (14)
is needed to ensure that the date zero cash-in-advance constraint holds. Finally, an imple-





1t =0.(1 5 )
In a longer version of this essay we established the result that follows.
Proposition 2 Let M0 > 0. A bounded sequence χ a n dap r i c epN
0 > 0 satisfy (1) and
(8)-(15) if and only if they are components of an attainable array (ξ,ϕ,χ,ζ).
The government budget constraint is a linear combination of the household’s budget
constraint, resource constraints and balance of payments. For this reason the above set of
conditions does not include an implementability constraint for equation (2).
Recall that the Friedman rule speciﬁes that, for all t, it+1 =0 . From people’s ﬁrst-order
conditions, it is easy to conclude that equality holds if and only if u2(t +1 )=u1(t +1 ) .
To help us analyze the second and higher-order best policies, we will brieﬂy discuss the
properties of policies that lead to Pareto eﬃcient outcomes. In this economy, an allocation
is Pareto eﬃcient if and only if it maximizes (3) subject to (1) and (12). Under standard
assumptions on u, there is a unique Pareto eﬃcient allocation. Conditions (1) and (12) plus
























fully characterize a Pareto eﬃcient allocation.
Straightforward calculations show that necessary and suﬃcient conditions that charac-






















The Friedman rule ensures the absence of a wedge between the consumption of cash and
credit non-tradables. The equalities in (20) constitute a standard uniform taxation require-
ment. Condition (21) requires that no wedge exists between the prevailing international
interest rate and the rate at which the household can borrow and lend abroad.
84R a m s e y e ﬃ c i e n c y
Following the tradition that Ramsey [16] started, in this section we study the problem
of selecting a best attainable allocation. However, we carry out this task under diﬀerent
assumptions about the ability of the Ramsey planner to select the tax rates.
A standard procedure to compute the Ramsey allocation is to maximize the lifetime utility
(3) subject to some implementability constraints. Regardless of which taxes the government
can select, conditions (1), (11) and (12)-(15) must constrain the allocation being chosen.
The remaining constraints to be considered depend on which taxes are exogenous and which




t=0 are exogenous, then (8) must constrain
the Ramsey planner’s choice. On the other hand, if the planner picks at least one of these
taxes, then that condition can be disregarded.
The reasoning presented in the above paragraph is used throughout this section. We
assume that some taxes are exogenous. Then, we identify the constraints the Ramsey planner
faces and solve a standard maximization problem. In the last step, we check whether or not
a solution to that problem satisﬁes the Friedman rule.
We next introduce three assumptions on preferences. These assumptions are nested, in
the sense that the last one implies the second and the second implies the ﬁrst.
Let the acronym NH stand for non-tradable homotheticity and non-tradable separability.1
The assumption that follows is a natural extension of the typical assumption of one-sector
cash-credit models to our two-sector economy.
Assumption NH There are functions H : R2
+ → R+, homogeneous of degree k>0,a n d
F : R2












Observe that the assumption on preferences found in Chari, Christiano and Kehoe [5]
places two conditions on those goods whose marginal rate of substitution would be distorted
by a positive nominal interest rate: (i) they are aggregated in homothetic fashion; and (ii)
that aggregation has to be separable from the remaining arguments of the utility function.
Assumption NH requires exactly this.
We next present some examples of period utility functions and discuss whether each of
them respects NH. In what follows, θ1, θ2, θ
T, θ
















1 )ν + θ2(cN
2 )ν + θ
T(cT)ν1−θl





l < 1;(2 3 )
1NHNS could be a more appropriate shortcut. However, the other hypotheses we consider also involve
non-tradable separability. Since the letters N and S would also show up in all the other acronyms, we simply






















+ f(l) , θ
T < 1 (25)









θ2 + f(l) , θ2 < 1 (26)
does not (although it homogeneously aggregates the consumption goods). Most of the quan-
titative macroeconomic papers adopt period preferences as in (22), (23) and (24), the last
one being used mostly in open economy models.
Function (25) respects NH, but it does not aggregate all consumption goods in a homo-
geneous fashion. If we require, in addition to NH, that all three consumption goods satisfy
a homogeneity condition, it is possible to obtain some additional results.
Assumption TNH There are functions H : R2
+ → R+, homogeneous of degree k>0,
˜ H : R2
+ → R+, homogeneous of degree ˜ k>0,a n d ˜ F : R2






















The acronym TNH stands for tradable and non-tradable homotheticity and non-tradable
separability. Functions (22), (23) and (24) respect assumption TNH, while (25) and (26) do
not.
The next assumption imposes a stronger separability on labor.
Assumption LATNH There are functions H : R2
+ → R+, homogeneous of degree k>0,
˜ H : R2




















The acronym LATNH stands for labor additivity, tradable and non-tradable homotheticity,
and non-tradable separability. Functions (22), (23), (25) and (26) do not respect LATNH,
while (24) does.
In a longer version of this essay we established the result that follows.
Lemma 3 If u satisﬁes NH, then u1T/u1 = u2T/u2, u1l/u1 = u2l/u2 and W1/u1 = W2/u2.
If u satisﬁes TNH, then the previous three equalities hold, u2l/u2 = uTl/uT and W2/u2 =




10Let us outline the structure of the remainder of this section. We ﬁrst will show that the
Friedman rule is optimal whenever the Ramsey planner can select {τN
t }∞
t=0. Then we will
show that there are tax systems in which the Ramsey planner cannot select {τN
t }∞
t=0 and the
Friedman rule is still optimal.
Proposition 4 Assume that u satisﬁes NH. If the Ramsey planner can select {τN
t }∞
t=0,t h e n
the optimal policy speciﬁes it+1 =0for all t.
Proof. This proof builds on the arguments of Chari, Christiano and Kehoe [5]. Combine










ul(t) .(2 7 )
Note that given some allocation χ, the Ramsey planner can pick {τN
t }∞
t=0 so that (9) is
satisﬁed.
For the time being, assume that all taxes but {τN
t }∞
t=0 are exogenous. Consider the
problem of maximizing (3) subject to (1), (8), (27), (11), (12), (14) and (15). If it were not
for (13), a solution to this problem would be a best competitive equilibrium allocation. So,







tηt be Lagrange multipliers for, respectively, (11), the resource
constraint of the non-tradable sector, (8) and (27). The ﬁrst-order condition for cN
jt, t ≥ 1













































The equalities in Lemma 3 lead to u1(t)=u2(t).











t=0 are still exogenous, it suﬃces to drop the proper
constraints from the Ramsey problem. If {τl
t}∞

























Thus, it is possible to rewrite (11) so that it does not depend on {τl
t}∞
t=0. Then, exactly







endogenous, the only circumstance in which the Ramsey planner will not be willing to fully
tax the respective proﬁts is when the government can balance its budget without using the
available distorting taxes. But this amount to saying that u1(t)=u2(t).S o , t h e r e i s n o
11loss of generality in assuming the corresponding proﬁt is taxed at a 100% rate. Hence, it is






























tW(t) .(2 8 )
Again, the previous reasoning establishes that u1(t)=u2(t). 
The intuition for the above result is as follows. A positive nominal interest rate raises
revenue for the government and distorts the margin u1/u2. On the other hand, a tax on
consumption of non-tradables also raises revenue, but it does not distort that margin. So, it
is never optimal to use the nominal interest rate to raise revenue. In other words, as Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe [17] pointed out, in a cash-credit model inﬂation acts as an imperfect
substitute for a tax on consumption.
It follows directly from Proposition 4 that {τN
t }∞
t=0 being endogenous is a suﬃcient con-
dition for the optimality of the Friedman rule. We will now establish a sequence of results
where {τN
t }∞
t=0 is exogenous and zero nominal interest rates are still optimal.















t=0,t h e n
the optimal policy speciﬁes it+1 =0for all t.
Proof. Suppose that {τl
t}∞







nous. Thus, given some allocation χ, the Ramsey planner can pick {τN
t }∞
t=0 so that (10) is
satisﬁed, {τT
t }∞
t=0 so that (9) holds and {τF
t }∞
t=0 to satisfy (8). Thus, the Ramsey planner
can disregard these constraints. Of course, the same is true regardless of which sequence is
exogenous.
Observe that if a best competitive equilibrium allocation can be implemented by policies
that satisfy δ
N
t < 1 or δ
T
t < 1 for some t, this amounts to saying that the available lump-
sum tax revenues have not been fully used up. Then, the allocation in question must be






Consider the problem of maximizing (3) subject to (1), (28), (12), (14), and (15). Let
Γ and β
tγN
t be the previously deﬁned Lagrange multipliers. For t ≥ 1 and j ∈{ 1,2},t h e











Apply Lemma 3 to conclude that u1(t)=u2(t), which implies it =0 . 
As discussed in the above proof, when just one of the conceivable distorting taxes is
exogenous, the Ramsey problem is a standard second-best one. It is well known that the
12Friedman rule is a feature of second-best policies in cash-credit models. Chari, Christiano
and Kehoe [5] provided the intuition for this result. Given the homogeneity and separability
assumption on the consumption of non-tradables, it is optimal to tax these goods at the
same rate. But a positive nominal interest rate would imply taxing cN
1t at rate higher than
cN
2t. Therefore, the Ramsey planner will be willing to implement the Friedman rule.
It has been argued that in an open economy, the existence of a given international interest
rate will impact the behavior of domestic agents in a way that the Friedman rule may fail to
be optimal. A possible way to circumvent such a constraint is to tax the income on foreign
assets. This possibility is encompassed in Proposition 5. However, the same proposition also
shows that even if τF
t =0 , the Friedman rule may still be optimal. All that is needed is for
the Ramsey planner to have access to a suﬃciently large set of alternative tax instruments.
If we add Assumption TNH to the hypothesis of the previous proposition, we will conclude
that all consumption goods are taxed in a uniform way. The intuition is the same one
provided for Proposition 5.
Proposition 6 Assume that u satisﬁes TNH. Under the remaining assumptions of Propo-
sition 5, the optimal policy speciﬁes it+1 =0and τN
t+1 = τT
t+1 for all t.
Proof. Since TNH implies NH, the optimality of the Friedman rule follows directly from
Proposition 5. For the second equality, let β
tγT
t be a Lagrange multiplier for the tradable


























αN−1 .(3 1 )










t=0 are endogenous cannot be dispensed with in





A possible way for the Ramsey planner to indirectly tax the proﬁt ψ
N
t is to raise τN
t .T h i si s
so because the real proﬁt depends positively on the output. Therefore, the planner faces a
trade-oﬀ. By selecting τN
t = τT
t , the margin uT/u2 is not distorted and by selecting τN
t >τ T
t
it will be possible to tax ψ
N
t . A compromise between these conﬂicting goals may call for
some diﬀerence in consumption tax rates.






t=0 is a little subtler when it comes
to the optimality of the Friedman rule. Suppose that taxes on proﬁts are both exogenous
and smaller than 100%. If {τN
t }∞
t=0 is exogenous, then the Friedman rule can fail to be
optimal. The intuition again is simple. If the planner cannot select {τN
t }∞
t=0, she may use
the a positive nominal interest rate to tax ψ
N
t in an indirect way.
13The above discussion becomes more relevant if we recall that the assumption of monopo-
listic competition is widely used in the literature. In such a context, equilibrium proﬁts can
be positive. Hence, the lack of both consumption and proﬁt taxes may render the Friedman
rule non-optimal in that class of models.
The next result is a direct consequence of Proposition 6, but it has some interesting
implications.
Corollary 7 Assume that u satisﬁes TNH. If consumption tax rates are exogenous and
satisfy τN
t = τT











then the optimal policy speciﬁes it+1 =0for all t.




t =1 . Given an allocation χ,t h e
Ramsey planner can set τF
t and τl
t to satisfy (8) and (10). Consider now the problem of
maximizing (3) subject to (1), (28), (12), (14) and (15). As in Proposition 6, its solution
will satisfy u1(t+1)=u2(t+1).H e n c e ,i tr e m a i n st os h o wt h a ti ts a t i s ﬁ e s(9 ) .B u tt h i sc a n




The intuition for the above result is as follows. We showed in Proposition 6 that under
TNH a second-best policy satisﬁes τN
t+1 = τT
t+1. Hence, we just introduced an optimality
condition as a constraint. Since such a constraint will not bind, the features of the optimal
policy are not aﬀected.
The hypothesis of Corollary 7 encompasses the case in which τN
t = τT
t =0 . Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe [17] concluded, in a one-sector small open economy setup, that if the
Ramsey planner does not have access to consumption taxes the Friedman rule is not optimal.









t=0 in an optimal fashion.
Corollary 7 has implications to the optimal monetary policy in the presence of under-
ground economic activity. For instance, consider a situation in which the government cannot
observe the consumption of some goods. However, it can observe the income generated in
the sectors that produce these goods. We can relate that situation to Corollary 7 by setting
τN
t = τT
t =0 . In such a context, the Friedman rule is optimal.
We established in Proposition 6 that if TNH holds, a second-best policy induces an
allocation that displays, for t ≥ 1, properties (16) and (17) of a Pareto eﬃcient allocation.
Under assumption LATNH, it is possible to show that a second-best allocation satisﬁes (18).
Of course, this last condition is satisﬁed in a competitive equilibrium if and only if (21)
holds.
Proposition 8 Assume that u satisﬁes LATNH. Under the remaining assumptions of Propo-
sition 5, the optimal policy satisﬁes it+1 =0 , τN
t+1 = τT
t+1 and (21) for all t.
Proof. Since LATNH implies TNH, the ﬁrst two equalities follow from Proposition 6. Let
γT





















This last expression combined with Lemma 3 and equation (7) yields (21). 
The intuition for the last proposition is as follows. Under LATNH, date t and t +1
consumption levels are intra and intertemporally separable from labor decisions. Therefore,
the traditional uniform consumption taxation result holds at an intertemporal level. As a
side comment, if we interpret the foreign bonds as a storage technology for the tradable good,
Proposition 8 has an obvious analogy with the results on the taxation of physical capital
income in Chari and Kehoe [6].







t=0 are exogenous and satisfy τN
t+1 = τT
t+1 and (21),
then the Friedman rule is optimal. Of course, the implications presented after Proposition
6 remains valid in this context in which the Ramsey planner has access to a smaller set of
tax instruments.
As Chari and Kehoe [6] did while studying the Friedman rule, it is possible to relate
the ﬁndings of this section to the classic paper of Diamond and Mirrlees [9] on production
eﬃciency. We can interpret cN
1t and cN
2t as two intermediate inputs for the production of a
ﬁnal good cN
t . Production eﬃciency requires taxing cN
1t and cN
2t at the same rate. In our
monetary economy, this entails implementing the Friedman rule.
The analogy with Diamond and Mirrlees is useful, but a word of caution is in order.
Consider Proposition 4. Suppose that all taxes but {τN
t }∞
t=0 are exogenous and equal to
zero. Assume that to balance the government budget, the optimal value of τN
t is positive
at every period. Hence, τN
t  = τT
t and the consumption goods are not taxed uniformly.
If we interpret cN
1t, cN
2t and cT
t as inputs to produce a ﬁnal good ct, we conclude that the
intermediate goods are not taxed at the same rate. However, the optimality of the Friedman
rule implies that the Ramsey planner picks a common rate for those taxes she can select.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The optimality of the Friedman rule is a classic result in monetary economics. However,
that conclusion relied on the hypothesis that the Ramsey planner had access to a complete
set of distorting tax instruments. Some papers showed that if policymakers were unable
to implement some conceivable distorting taxes, then the optimal monetary policy would
prescribe positive nominal interest rates.
In this paper we investigated the relation between the optimality of the Friedman rule
and the set of distorting tax instruments available to a benevolent planner. We carried
out the study in a two-sector (tradable and non-tradable goods) deterministic small open
15economy framework. We introduced money by assuming that a fraction of people’s purchases
of non-tradables had to be paid in cash.
We showed that the Friedman rule is optimal whenever the Ramsey planner can select
the tax rate on the consumption of non-tradables. Moreover, there exist several situations in
which that tax is exogenous and the Friedman rule remains optimal. Hence, the optimality of
the Friedman rule may survive even if we severely restrict the ability of the Ramsey planner
to select the tax rates.
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Appendix
We have argued that the results on the optimality of the Friedman rule presented in Section 4 can
be generalized to other monetary environments. Although we provide intuition for them, we believe
that formally obtaining the equivalent of at least one of those results in a distinct monetary model
is a valuable exercise.
Ideally, we would consider an economy that is complex enough to allow us to carry out an
exercise similar to those of Section 4 and simple enough so that numerical methods are not necessary.
To attain these two competing goals, we adopt in this section a simple two-sector closed economy
in which money is introduced by means of a shopping-time friction.
The economy produces two goods, 1 and 2. For convenience, deﬁne J = {1,2}. Both people
and government consume these goods. At each date t, resource constraints require, for j ∈ J,
cjt + gjt = l
αj
jt (32)
where cjt and gjt denote, respectively, people’s and government’s consumption of good j and ljt
denotes the amount of time people work in that sector. As before, αj belong to (0,1] and the t
subscript denotes time.
17The government levies taxes on proﬁts, consumption and labor income. These taxes may vary
across sectors. The government budget constraint is

j∈J








where pjt is the price of good j; τc
jt is the tax rate on the consumption of good j; τl
jt is the tax
rate on the the gross nominal wage wjt paid in sector j; δjt is the tax rate on the proﬁt ψjt of ﬁrm
j; Mt and Bt correspond to household end-of-period cash and bond holdings,2 while it−1 is the
nominal interest rate. We assume that the government has no outstanding debt at the beginning
of date zero, that is, (1 + i−1)B−1 + M−1 =0 .




tu(c1t,c 2t,h t) (33)












jt)wjtljt +( 1− δjt)ψjt

.(3 4 )
Standard boundedness constraints prevent Ponzi schemes. Purchases of good 1 require household










Denote the ratio Mt/[(1 + τc
1t)p1t] by mt. The transaction function v is homogeneous of
degree k ≥ 0 and non negative. It satisﬁes standard monotonicity, diﬀerentiability and convexity
conditions. Moreover, if vm(c1,m)=0 , then v(c1,m)=0 , where vm = ∂v/∂m.
The household maximizes (33) subject to (34), (35) and ht + l1t + l2t + st ≤ 1. On the other
hand, each ﬁrm j behaves in a competitive fashion. It selects ljt to maximize ψjt = pjtl
αj
jt −wjtljt.
2Here we departed from the dating convention adopted in the previous sections of this paper.
So far, a stock variable with subscript t would correspond to the beginning of period value of
the variable in question. We believe that the previous convention was the natural one for our
cash-credit economy. On the other hand, the dating convention adopted in this section is the one
usually adopted in shopping-time models. Needless to say, none of our results depend on the chosen
notation.
3There are many ways one can interpret the monetary friction and other features of the economy
we consider in this section. For instance, set all taxes in sector 2 equal to zero and think of that
sector as one that produces household goods. Clearly, in such a context the shopping-time constraint
should aﬀect only the purchases of c1.
18As before, u1(t), u2(t), uh(t), v1(t) and vm(t) denote the partial derivatives of u and v evaluated
at the point (c1t,c 2t,h t,m t). Similarly, v(t)=v(c1t,m t).T h ef a c t o rW(t) is redeﬁned according
to
W(t)=u1(t)c1t + u2(t)c2t − uh(t)(1 − ht)+( 1− k)uh(t)v(t) ,
while W1, W2, Wh,a n dWm denote its partial derivatives.







an object {(cjt,l jt)j∈J,h t,m t}
∞










































ht + l1t + l2t + v(t)=1.(3 9 )
Condition (36) ensures that the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and good 2 is
consistent with the prevailing real wage rate and the tax rates in that sector. Condition (37) can
be interpreted in a similar way once we remember that the consumption of good 1 must respect
(35). Equation (38) consolidates the household budget constraints (34), while (39) simply ensures
that the household uses exactly its endowment of time.







Therefore, the Friedman rule will hold in a competitive equilibrium if and only if vm(t)=0for all
t.
A quick inspection of (37) shows that τc
1t and τl
1t may distort the margin u1/uh. However,
even if we had τc
1t = −τl
1t, that margin could be distorted. For that to happen, it would suﬃce
to have v1(t) > 0. On the other hand, kv(t)=v1(t)c1t + vm(t)mt.M o r e o v e r ,vm(t)=0implies
v(t)=0 . Hence, if vm(t)=0 , then v1(t)=0 . So, implementing the Friedman rule entails not
using a tax on money services that distorts the marginal rate of substitution between c1 and h.
In the spirit of Proposition 4, suppose that the Ramsey planner can choose {τc
1t}∞
t=0.I f t h e
intuition we have developed is correct, the Friedman Rule has to be optimal. The reason is simple.
Since τc
1t is endogenous, the Ramsey planner has two instruments to impact the margin u1(t)/uh(t).
The ﬁrst is τc
1t itself. The second is it, since v1(t) depends on mt w h i c hi nt u r nd e p e n d so n
it. Vis-à-vis τc
1t, a positive nominal interest rate has the disadvantage of reducing the time the
household has available for leisure and production of goods. Hence, the Ramsey policy should call
for implementing the Friedman rule whenever {τc
1t}∞
t=0 is endogenous.
19We now formalize the argument of the last paragraph. If {τc
1t}∞
t=0 is endogenous, the Ramsey
problem is to select {(cjt,l jt)j∈J,h t,m t}
∞
t=0 to maximize (33) subject to (32), (38) and (39). Con-




t=0 is endogenous. Otherwise,
this constraint will show up in the Ramsey problem.
Let Γ and β
tγh
t be Lagrange multipliers for, respectively, (38) and (39). The ﬁrst-order condition






The above condition also appears in Correia and Teles [7] and De Fiore and Teles [10]. As these
authors pointed out, both Lagrange multipliers are positive. So, for k ≥ 1,v m(t)=0and the
Friedman rule is optimal.
T h ec a s ew h e r ek<1 requires additional work. Denote the partial derivative of uh/u2 with
respect to h by Dh. We assume Dh < 0 and u1hc1+u2hc2 ≥ 0. Besides this, for the case in which
the Ramsey planner can choose only τc







t denotes the value that ratio would assume in a second-best
solution.




2t) and denote its Lagrange multiplier
by β
tηt. Combining the ﬁrst-order condition for ht with (40) we obtain
(k − 1)Γuh(t)+γ
h























O u ra s s u m p t i o n so nτl
2t,τc
2t and R∗
t ensure that ηt ≥ 0. Thus, the right-hand side of (41) is strictly
positive. Hence, (k − 1)Γuh(t)+γh
t > 0 and (40) implies that vm(t)=0 .
As we have just mentioned, the above result is the equivalent of Proposition 4 for this two-sector
shopping-time setup. We could also obtain other results similar to those of Section 4.
20